• encouraging individual or collective action through the provision of subsidies (or tax concessions) or grants in conjunction with levies.
Intellectual property rights are applicable or enforceable only for certain types of inventions, and they have the disadvantage that privately optimal prices may exceed socially optimal prices. 2 Commodity-specific levy arrangements are most applicable for commodity-specific R&D of a relatively applied nature (as implemented in Australia, Colombia, and Uruguay, for instance), although more general agricultural R&D could be funded by a more general agricultural levy (as in the Netherlands). In cases where the fruits of invention can be only partially appropriated, a case can be made for partial support from general government revenues through subsidies or matching grants in conjunction with commodity levies, as used in the Australian R&D corporations (see, for example, Alston, Freebairn, and James 2004) . To some extent, questions about how to finance agricultural R&D can be separated from who conducts the research, what research is undertaken, and how the R&D process is managed. It is useful to consider these elements as separate issues, but inevitably they become intertwined.
In addition to efficiency gains from increasing the total R&D investment, the government can also intervene with a view to improving the efficiency with which resources are used within the R&D system. Changes over time in economic circumstances imply changes in R&D institutions. Some research activities that were once clearly perceived as the province of the government have become part of the private domain. Examples include much applied work into the development and evaluation of new agricultural chemicals and new plant varieties. Both in one country over time, and among different countries at the same time, circumstances differ in ways that call for different policies and institutional arrangements. Policies must be suited to the setting. Some restructuring or consolidation of agricultural R&D institutions, in some instances on a geographic basis, is warranted by the changing nature of the research being undertaken; its focus relative to agriculture, agribusiness, and the environment; and the spatial and economic applicability of the results, as well as the changing nature of economies of size, scale, and scope in research. In addition to changes in the organization of research institutions, there is also scope for more economic rationalism in the processes for managing research and allocating research resources and in the structure of incentives for scientists.
Distinctive Features of Less-Developed Countries
These general notions about market failure and options for government action apply generally, but with different specific implications as cases change. Less-developed countries tend to differ from more-developed countries in some systematic ways. In particular, for a number of reasons, the phenomenon of private-sector neglect and national underinvestment in agricultural R&D is likely to be more pronounced in less-developed countries than in developed ones. Why is this so, and what does it imply?
First, less-developed countries are commonly characterized as having a comparatively high incidence of incomplete markets, resulting from high transaction costs and inadequate property rights, which in turn may be attributable to inadequate infrastructure and defective institutions, among other things. To the extent that they exist, information problems, high transport and communications costs, poorly functioning credit markets, and the like, combined with the limited education of some farmers, are likely to make it harder to capitalize on new inventions. In rich countries, we might discount the issues of risk and capital costs as disincentives to investment in invention, but in less-developed countries these factors might take on a greater importance, especially if capital markets do not function well-for whatever reason.
Second, the types of technology often suited to less-developed country agriculture have hitherto been of the sort for which appropriability problems are more pronounced-types that have been comparatively neglected by the private sector even in the richest countries. In particular, until recently, private research has tended to emphasize mechanical and chemical technologies, which are comparatively well protected by patents, trade secrecy, and other intellectual property rights; and the private sector has generally neglected varietal technologies except where the returns are appropriable, as for hybrid seed (see Olmstead and Rhode 2002) . In lessdeveloped countries, the emphasis in innovation has often been on self-pollinating crop varieties and disembodied farm management practices, which are the least appropriable of all. The recent innovations in rich-country institutions mean that private firms are now finding it more profitable to invest in plant varieties; the same may be true in some less-developed countries, but not all countries have made comparable institutional changes. 3 Third, in many less-developed countries, prices have been distorted by policies in ways that diminish incentives and opportunities for farmers to adopt new technologies (see Schultz 1978; Alston and Pardey 1993; and Sunding and Zilberman 2001) . 4 Only when we achieve a reasonable rate of inventor appropriability of the returns to the technologies that are applicable in less-developed countries, combined with an economic infrastructure that facilitates adoption of those technologies, can we expect a significant private-sector role to emerge.
Accepting that markets may fail, for whatever reason, we have to consider the possibility that governments in less-developed countries also might fail-in this case, fail to correct the underinvestment in agricultural research-for both economic and political reasons. For instance, and as a fourth factor accounting for their low rates of investment in agricultural R&D, government revenues may be comparatively expensive, or have a comparatively high opportunity cost in lessdeveloped countries. This can be so because it is comparatively expensive to raise government revenues through general taxation measures. 5 And many less-developed countries are characterized by underinvestment in a host of other public goods, such as transportation and communications infrastructure, schools, and hospitals, as well as agricultural science (Runge et al. 2003) , which might also have high social rates of return.
Fifth, there are political factors to consider. In rich countries, agriculture is a small share of the economy, and any individual citizen bears a negligible burden from financing a comparatively high rate of public investment in agricultural R&D (for instance, in the United States, the public expenditure of US$3.8 billion on agricultural R&D in 2000 amounted to less than US$14 per person per year). The factors that account for high rates of general support for agriculture in the industrialized countries can also help account for the comparatively high intensity of public agricultural research. In many less-developed countries, where agriculture represents a much greater share of the total economic activity, and where per capita incomes are much lower, a meaningful investment in public agricultural research may have a much more appreciable impact on individual citizens. This burden is felt immediately, whereas the payoff it promises may take a long time to come and will be much less perceptible when it does.
Finally, even many of the rich countries of the world have not had very substantial private or public agricultural science industries. Why should we expect the poorest countries of the world to act like the richest of the rich in this regard? 6 The lion's share of the public (as well as private) investment in agricultural science has been undertaken by a small number of countries; and these have been the countries that have also undertaken the greatest share of scientific research, more generally. Typically, these have been the large economic powerhouses, especially the United States. Differences in per capita income, the total size of the economy, and comparative advantages in science (reflecting not just wealth but also the nature of the society) may all have influenced the international distribution of the burden of agricultural R&D investments.
It might not make economic sense for small, poor, agrarian nations to spend their comparatively scarce intellectual and other capital resources in agricultural science on their own behalf in a world in which other countries can do it so much more effectively. 7 And in the past it has been an effective strategy for many nations to free-ride on the efforts of a few others in agricultural R&D. Both inadvertent technology spillovers and international initiatives such as the CGIAR and bilateral agricultural R&D development aid might have crowded out some national investments in agricultural R&D in less-developed countries. 8 An important consideration is economies of size, scale, and scope in research, which influence the optimal size and portfolio of a given research institution. In some cases the "optimal" institution may efficiently provide research for a state or region within a nation, but for some kinds of research the efficient scale of institutions may be too great for an individual nation (see, for example, Byerlee and Traxler 2001) . Many nations may be too small to achieve an efficient scale in any of the relevant elements of their agricultural R&D interests, except perhaps in certain types of adaptive research. A particular problem for efficiency in agricultural science, especially for many smaller countries, is that there are few effective institutions for financing and organizing research on a multinational basis when the research is applicable across multiple countries, and individual countries are too small to achieve efficient scale (see Chapter 12 in this volume).
Technology Spillovers: Past, Present, and Future
The history of agricultural development shows that agricultural technology need not be home-grown; over the years it has been bought, borrowed, and stolen. For instance, in the late 18th century, Thomas Jefferson, risking the death penalty, smuggled rice seeds out of Italy in the lining of his coat to encourage cultivation of the crop in South Carolina. Agricultural innovations move across borders, both by design and by accident. These technology spillovers imply both international market failures and a case for multinational government action to correct them, paralleling the intranational arguments presented above.
R&D spillovers among geopolitical entities arise when research conducted by one state (or nation) confers benefits on other states (or nations) that are able to adopt the results. Such spillovers have two kinds of implications for research policy. First, they add complications to already awkward policy questions that arise when research is being conducted and funded by state and national governments-such as how much and what mix of research should be undertaken, who should pay for it, who should do it, and what institutional arrangements should be put in place. Second, and perhaps more important, they introduce an additional dimension to incentive problems. The fundamental economic basis for the government support of agricultural research is incomplete appropriability of research benefits by inventors. Research and technology spillovers among research providers within a state can be addressed (at least in principle) by state-government policy, but stategovernment policy cannot effectively address spillovers across state boundaries.
Similarly, federal-government policy might address spillovers among research providers in different states within a nation, but national-government policy cannot effectively address spillovers among nations.
Alston (2002) reviewed the evidence of agricultural R&D spillovers, with emphasis on the international dimension. The main findings can be stated simply. First, intranational and international spillovers of public agricultural R&D results are very important. In the small proportion of studies that have taken them into account, spillovers were responsible for a sizable share-in many cases, more than half-of total measured agricultural productivity growth and the corresponding research benefits. Second, spillovers can have profound implications for the distribution of research benefits between consumers and producers and thus among countries, depending on their trade status and capacity to adopt the technology. Third, it is not easy to measure these impacts, and the results can be sensitive to the specifics of the approach taken, but studies that ignore interstate and international spillovers are likely to obtain seriously distorted estimates of the returns to agricultural research. Finally, because spillovers are so important, research resources have been misallocated both within and among nations. In particular, international spillovers contribute to a global underinvestment in agricultural R&D that existing public policies have only partly succeeded in correcting. 9 The stakes are large because the benefits from agricultural technology spillovers are worth many times more than the investments that give rise to them.
This volume examines spillovers from a less-developed-country perspective. It is important to note the important role of spillins to the world's poorest countries of technologies from industrialized countries (especially the United States, but also the United Kingdom, France, and others), both individually and through their collective action via the CGIAR. Until recently, much of the successful innovative effort in most of the world's poorer countries applied at the very last stage of the process-selecting and adapting crop varieties and livestock breeds for local conditions using materials developed elsewhere. Only a few larger countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, were able to achieve much by themselves at the more upstream stages of the research and innovation process, even for improved crop technologies for which conventional breeding strategies are widely applied. Until recently that strategy was reasonable, given an abundant and freely accessible supply of suitable materials, at least for the main temperate-zone food crops. Changes in the emphasis of rich-country research, combined with new intellectual property rules and practices and an increased use of modern biotechnology methods, have already begun to spell a drying up of the public pool of new varieties. In addition, and as set out in detail in Chapter 12, the other main source of varietal materialsthe CGIAR-has changed its emphasis and is scaling back its role in providing finished material or advanced breeding lines. 10 The reduction in spillovers from these traditional sources means that less-developed countries will have to find new ways of meeting their demands for new varieties.
Research Spending Patterns
The public and private roles in agricultural science have changed, reflecting changing economic conditions in the broader economy as well as in agriculture. Changes have also occurred in institutional arrangements, such as intellectual property rights, and in public attitudes and perceptions. Although many elements of the changes have been common to various countries, reflecting common influences at work, there have been some important divergences among countries as well-especially between the richest and the poorest countries. Pardey et al. (2006) document these changes.
General Trends
Over the last two decades of the 20th century, worldwide public investments in agricultural research increased by 51 percent in inflation-adjusted terms, from an estimated $15.2 billion (in 2000 international dollars) in 1981 to around $23 billion in 2000 (Table 2 .1). 11 During the 1990s, for the first time, developing countries as a group undertook more of the world's public agricultural research than the developed countries, but with the Asian and Pacific region and China accounting for more of the developing-country total, and Sub-Saharan Africa losing market share.
What the regional totals fail to reveal is that public spending was concentrated in only a handful of countries. The United States, Japan, France, and Germany accounted for two-thirds of the $10.2 billion of public research done by rich countries in 2000, about the same as two decades before. Similarly, four of the developing countries among those included in this book-China, India, Brazil, and South Africa-spent almost 50 percent of the developing world's public agricultural research money in 2000, up from 37 percent in 1981.
Despite this pattern of strong longer-term growth in spending since the 1970s, for many parts of the world the rapid and quite pervasive growth in spending during the 1970s and early 1980s gave way to a dramatic slowdown during the 1990s. In the rich countries, public investment actually shrank by 0.58 percent annually between 1991 and 2000, compared with an increase of 2.3 percent per year during the 1980s. Spending in Africa grew by only 0.82 percent per year in the 1990s-a much slower rate than during the 1980s (1.25 percent per year). This slowing reflects a longer-run trend: rapid growth in spending in the 1960s gradu-ally gave way in the 1980s and beyond to debt crises, curbs on government spending, and waning donor support for agriculture in general, and agricultural R&D in particular, during the 1990s. In fact, if large countries like Nigeria and South Africa are excluded, spending for Africa overall actually declined by 2.5 percent per year during the 1990s (Beintema and Stads 2004) . Spending in Asia grew by an average of 3.9 percent per year during the 1990s, compared with 4.3 percent annually during the previous decade. Growth slowed in the Middle East and North Africa as well.
China and India are exceptions. Growth in spending during the 1990s averaged 5.04 percent per year in China and 6.37 percent per year in India. Things look a little better in Latin America, too, with spending growing 2.06 percent per year from 1991 to 2000, compared with about half that rate during the previous decade. But the recovery in Latin America seems fragile and is not distributed evenly throughout the region. Public research in countries like Brazil (with public spending approaching a billion dollars a year, a considerably larger commitment than in any of the developed countries besides the United States and Japan) and Colombia did better in the early 1990s but suffered cutbacks in the later part of the decade. Many of the poorer (and smaller) countries have failed to experience any sustained growth in funding for the past several decades. 
Research Intensities
Turning now from absolute to relative measures of R&D investments, in 2000, developed countries as a group spent $2.36 on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of agricultural output, a sizable increase over the $1.41 they spent per $100 of output two decades earlier (Table 2 .2). Since 1981, research intensities have risen for the developing countries as a group, but unevenly. Despite having gained a greater absolute share of the developing world's total agricultural research spending, China's agricultural research intensity in 2000 was no greater than in 1981. In other words, China's research spending grew, but its agricultural sector grew just as quickly. Although public research throughout the rest of Asia and Latin America appears to have grown in intensity during the last decade of our data, Africa lost considerable ground, with research intensities now lower than in the 1970s. Other research-intensity ratios are also revealing. Rich countries spent nearly $700 per agricultural worker, more than double the corresponding 1981 ratio. Poor countries spent just $10.21 per agricultural worker in 2000, substantially less than double the 1981 figure. These differences are perhaps not surprising. A much smaller share of the rich-country workforce is employed in agriculture, and the absolute number of agricultural workers declined more rapidly in rich countries than it did in the poor ones. Agricultural research spending per capita rose, too, by an average of only 9 percent for developed countries (from $10.91 per capita in 1981 to $11.92 in 2000) and 29 percent in developing countries (from $2.12 per capita in 1981 to $2.73 in 2000). Notably, per capita research spending (in terms of both total population and agricultural workers) declined in Africa, the only region of the world where this occurred. 12
Private and Public Research Roles
By the mid-1990s, roughly one-third of the $36.9 billion total investment in agricultural research worldwide was by private firms, including those involved in providing farm inputs and processing farm products (Table 2. 3). But little of this private research took place in developing countries. The overwhelming majority ($12.6 billion, or 91 percent of the global total) was conducted in developed countries. In the less-developed countries, where public funds are still the major source of support, the private share of research was just 8.3 percent. (Public funds remain a significant source of support in rich countries, too, accounting for about 45 percent of their total funding in 2000).
Although more than one-half of the world's public R&D dollars are spent in developing countries, only one-third of the public plus private research spending occurs there. In addition, the research-intensity gap between rich and poor countries is wide and growing. As we saw, in 2000, public research intensity was four times higher in rich countries than in poor ones; if total private and public spending is considered, the gap grows to more than eightfold, with rich countries spending about $5.27 on agricultural R&D per $100 of agricultural GDP.
Research Knowledge
The eightfold difference in total research intensities is an indication of the present gap in generating new technologies between rich and poor countries. However, a more meaningful measure of a country's technological capacity and a better account of cross-country differences in agricultural productivity is the size of the accumulated stock of knowledge-not merely the amount of investment in current research and innovative activity-it provides. Science is a cumulative endeavor. Innovations beget new ideas and further rounds of innovation, which ultimately add to the cumulative stock of knowledge. The current stock of knowledge and the contribution of past research spending to that stock is sensitive to the types of science being done, the institutional structures surrounding the science, and the economic context. Some science spending makes persistent and even perpetual contributions to the changing stock of locally produced knowledge; the same spending in societies ravaged by wars, institutional instability, and outright collapse may have a much more ephemeral effect.
The sequential and cumulative nature of scientific progress and knowledge is starkly illustrated by crop improvement. It typically takes seven to ten years of breeding to develop a uniform, stable, and superior crop variety; but today's breeders build on an accumulation of knowledge. Because breeding lines from earlier research are used to develop new varieties, research of the distant past is still feeding today's research. Providing adequate funding for research is thus only part of the story. Putting in place the policies and practices to accumulate innovations and increase the stock of knowledge is equally important and almost universally unappreciated. Discoveries and data that are improperly documented or inaccessible (and effectively exist only in the mind of the researcher) are lost from the historical record when researchers retire from science. These "hidden" losses seem particularly prevalent in cash-strapped research agencies in the developing world, where inadequate and often irregular amounts of funding limit the functioning of libraries, data banks, and genebanks, and hasten staff turnover.
ALSTON AND PARDEY
Political instability can lead to catastrophic losses, too. Civil strife and wars cause an exodus of scientific staff, or at least a flight from practicing science. Many of Uganda's scientific facilities, for example, were in shreds when its civil war ended in the early 1980s. It is hard to imagine that today's Congo once had perhaps the most sophisticated scientific infrastructure in colonial Africa, comparable to the facilities and quality of staff found in most developed countries at the time. Figure 2 .1 represents financial measures of the stock of scientific knowledge based on research performed in the United States (assuming a baseline rate of depreciation of the knowledge stock of 3 percent per annum) and Africa (for which we show both a 3 percent baseline depreciation rate and a rate of 6 percent per year, which is perhaps more realistic given the instability and lack of infrastructure for R&D throughout much of the region). Knowledge stocks in 1995-representing a discounted accumulation of research spending from 1850 for the United States and 1900 for Africa-were expressed as percentages of 1995 agricultural GDP to normalize for differences in the sizes of the respective agricultural sectors. The accumulated stock of knowledge in the United States was about 11 times the amount of agricultural output produced in 1995. In other words, for every $100 of agricultural output, there existed a $1,100 stock of knowledge to draw upon. In Africa, the stock of knowledge in 1995 was actually less than the value of African agricultural output that year. The ratio of the U.S. knowledge stock relative to U.S. agricultural output in 1995 was nearly 12 times higher than the corresponding amount for Africa. If a depreciation rate of 6 percent instead of 3 percent is used, the gap in American and African ratios is more than 14-fold.
Policy Implications
Agricultural R&D for less-developed countries is at a crossroads. The close of the 20th century witnessed changing policy contexts, fundamental shifts in the scientific basis for agricultural R&D, and shifting funding patterns for agricultural research in rich countries. These changes imply a need to rethink national policies in less-developed countries and reconsider multinational approaches in order to determine what types of activities to conduct through the CGIAR and similar institutions and how to organize and finance them. Even though there is no evidence to suggest that the world can afford to reduce its rate of investment in agricultural research, and every indication that we should invest more, we cannot presume that the rich countries of the world will play the same roles as in the past. In particular, countries that in the past relied on technological spillovers from the North may no longer have that luxury available to them in the same ways or to the same extent. This change can be seen as involving three elements:
• The types of technologies being developed in the rich countries may no longer be as readily applicable to less-developed countries as they were in the past: the agenda in richer countries is shifting away from areas like yield improvement in major crops to other crop characteristics and even to nonagricultural production concerns like health and nutrition and the environment.
• Applicable technologies developed in richer countries may not be as readily accessible because of intellectual-property protection of privately owned tech-nologies: many biotech companies have little or no interest in developing technologies for less-developed country applications; and even where they have such technologies available, they are often not interested in pursuing potential markets in less developed countries, for a host of reasons.
• Those technologies that are applicable and available are likely to require more substantial local development and adaptation, which call for more sophisticated and more extensive forms of scientific research and development than in the past: for instance, more advanced skills in modern biotechnology or conventional breeding may be required to take advantage of enabling technologies or simply to make use of less-finished lines that must be tailored to local production environments.
In short, different approaches may have to be devised to make it possible for less-developed countries to achieve equivalent access and tap into technological potentials generated by rich countries, and, in many instances, less-developed countries may have to extend their own R&D efforts upstream to more fundamental areas of the science.
Finally, it must be remembered that agricultural R&D is a slow business. As Pardey and Beintema note (2001, p. 2) : "It is the accumulation of results over the long haul that accounts for the differences in agricultural productivity observed around the world." In contemplating their evidence on stocks of knowledge, it can be seen that the imbalance between the North and the South is very much greater than the annual flows alone reveal. The tail end of the 20th century saw some evidence of a partial catching up, but the current prospects could spell a dangerous shift toward falling farther behind-and the long-term, dire consequences may not become apparent for some time to come. Notes 1. One explanation for this government failure is that, just as in the case of private market failure, when the distributions of benefits and costs of government-funded research are not closely aligned, incentives are distorted. If taxpayers in a country bear all of the cost of research that benefits a select group of producers, they have attenuated incentives to fund the amount of research that will maximize net national benefits, particularly if some of the producers who benefit are foreigners.
2. Many research outputs have public-good characteristics to some extent, implying socially optimal prices that may not allow for the recovery of costs. In the case of a "pure public good," one that is nonrival in consumption and non-price-excludable, the socially optimal price is zero (to achieve marginal social benefits equal to marginal social cost and thereby maximize net national benefits). Furthermore, patents and the like confer monopoly privileges, which result in prices above marginal cost, even for rival goods. See Lindner (1993 Lindner ( , 2003 .
3. Innovations in intellectual property rights regimes and biosafety protocols are seen as critical determinants of appropriability of returns to new crop and livestock technologies, but not all nations have gone as far as the United States in these respects. See Boettiger et al. 2004 for more discussions on these points.
4. The fact that the more-developed countries have distorted prices in the opposite direction is a double-edged sword for the less-developed countries. On the one hand, richer countries are encouraged to produce and innovate more rapidly, further depressing prices faced by less-developedcountry producers. On the other hand, as recipients of technology spillovers, the world's poorer producers have also benefited from an enhanced rate of technological development in the North.
5. A dollar of government spending costs society more than a dollar. For every dollar of government revenue, at least a dollar has been taken from someone as taxes (maybe someone living in a different place and time from those where research benefits will be realized). The marginal and average excess burden of taxation rises with increases in the price responsiveness of supply and demand (that is, elasticities) and the size of the tax rate; the total excess burden rises with the square of the tax rate. It follows that a small tax on an agricultural commodity must have a very small total, average, and marginal excess burden (regardless of the elasticities of supply and demand for such a small tax rate) compared with general taxation measures. To this amount, we can add the costs of enforcement, collection, and disbursement of the funds, the costs of compliance, and the social costs associated with market responses to the (dis)incentive effects of taxation (see, for example, Fox 1985; Fullerton 1991; and Alston and Pardey 1996 , Chapter 7).
6. As noted by Pardey et al. (2006) , investment in the sciences is generally much more concentrated in rich countries (which accounted for about 82 percent of global investment in all the sciences in the mid-1990s, with about 35 percent of that total occurring in the United States alone) than is agricultural R&D (in which rich countries conduct 63 percent of all agricultural R&D and 44 percent of the world's publicly funded agricultural research). Moreover, the geographical concentration of particular classes of agricultural research-for instance, research into agricultural chemicals or machinery-is even greater than that of agricultural R&D in general.
7. As demonstrated by Maredia and Byerlee (2000) , it has made economic sense for many less-developed countries to emphasize adapting research results from other countries rather than to participate directly in upstream research activities. Their results indicated that only 41 out of the total of 69 wheat-improvement programs operating in their sample of 39 developing countries could economically justify maintaining fully fledged wheat-breeding programs. For the remaining 28 programs, it would have made sense to restrict the scope of research to screening and selection roles-presuming that varieties from which to select and screen would continue to be available from other national and international sources.
8. Beintema and Stads (2004) found that donor contributions accounted for 35 percent of spending on agricultural R&D for the principle research agencies in a sample of 23 African countries in 2000.
9. There have also been private actions to address these international market-failure problems, including the efforts of philanthropic organizations like the Ford, Rockefeller, and, more recently, McKnight foundations to fund international collaborative research; multinational companies that operate in multiple markets; and private nonprofit entities like CAMBIA in Canberra, Australia, and the Donald Danforth Plant Science Center in St. Louis, Missouri, which conduct research in rich countries that is targeted to the agricultural concerns of poor countries.
10. Norman Borlaug, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and previously head of the wheat improvement program at the International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement (CIMMYT), pioneered a shuttle-breeding technique wherein two crops of wheat were planted each year (one in northern Mexico, the other in the southern part of the country) to accelerate the turnaround of successive crop generations when breeding improved wheat varieties. A dramatic illustration of the CGIAR's present financial plight is that, for the first time in almost three decades, CIMMYT could afford to plant only one breeding cycle in 2003.
11. All these data involve conversions from local currency units to U.S. dollar equivalents, using purchasing power parities rather than market exchange rates to account for cross-country price differentials. See Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig 1992 for details.
12. Roe and Pardey (1991) provide a political-economy perspective on these various researchintensity ratios.
